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Introduction 
 
 
Putin’s New National Guard 
Bulwark against Mass Protests and Illoyal Elites 
Margarete Klein 
A new Russian security organ was created on 3 July 2016. The National Guard takes 
over the interior ministry’s internal troops and police special forces and places them 
directly under the president’s control. The new force’s remit ranges from public order 
through counter-extremism and counter-terrorism to assistance in territorial defence 
and border protection. This reform represents the most significant restructuring of 
Russia’s internal security organs in more than ten years, and exposes Putin’s concerns 
over the robustness of his political system in face of persistent economic crisis and 
upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. In this context the National Guard 
can serve not only as an instrument of repression against possible mass protests, but 
also as a means of disciplining potentially illoyal elite groups. 
 
On 5 April 2016 President Vladimir Putin 
ordered the founding of the National Guard. 
The corresponding legislation passed the 
State Duma and Federation Council on 22 
and 29 June respectively, and came into 
force on 3 July. 
The National Guard will comprise some 
350,000 to 400,000 members. Its backbone 
is formed by the “internal troops” previously 
controlled by the interior ministry, a para-
military force of 170,000 to 180,000 includ-
ing conscripts. They are joined by heavily 
armed police special forces (about 30,000), 
including the OMON riot police and 
the OMSN/SOBR counter-terrorism units. 
The National Guard has also taken over 
administrative and training facilities as 
well as the federal enterprise Okhrana, 
which supplies security and protection 
services for companies and private indi-
viduals. 
Tasks, Powers, Equipment 
Under the new legislation, the National 
Guard’s principal responsibility is “protect-
ing public order and security”. This means 
dissolving unauthorised demonstrations, 
suppressing mass unrest and enforcing cur-
fews during any state of emergency. It is 
planned to involve National Guard forces in 
fighting extremism and terrorism, and they 
can also be deployed to reinforce border pro-
tection and for territorial defence. 
The National Guard’s powers extend 
from identity checks, house searches and 
detention through to robust coercive meas-
ures. If the lives or safety of its members or 
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the public are endangered, the National 
Guard may fire into crowds without prior 
warning. They have access to military and 
specialist equipment for fighting extrem-
ism and terrorism and tackling hostage 
situations. The National Guard accordingly 
possesses a broad arsenal ranging from 
non-lethal means (such as sonic weapons) 
through machine guns to armoured per-
sonnel carriers and rocket-propelled 
grenades. 
Anti-Terrorism and the World Cup 
According to President Putin, the National 
Guard had to be established in order to 
fight terrorism more effectively. Russia is 
indeed one of the European countries worst 
affected by terrorist attacks. Since the Che-
chen wars of the 1990s and 2000s, lack of 
economic perspective has turned the North 
Caucasus in particular into a region of 
unrest, within and out of which numerous 
acts of terrorism have been committed. In 
recent years thousands of Islamist fighters 
have left the North Caucasus to fight in 
Syria and Iraq. They had come under pres-
sure after Ramzan Kadyrov consolidated his 
power as head of the Chechen Republic and 
Russia conducted successful anti-terrorism 
operations in the region. There are reports 
that Russian security forces actually assisted 
Islamists to leave ahead of the 2014 Sochi 
Winter Olympics. While this may have 
brought short-term relief, the move risks 
blow-back when they return – especially 
with Russia now firmly in the Islamists’ 
sights since its intervention in Syria began 
in September 2015. Moreover, protecting 
the 2018 football World Cup in Russia will 
require considerable resources. 
However, even if fighting terrorism 
represents a central challenge, that alone 
is not adequate reason to create a National 
Guard. That purpose would have been served 
equally well by expanding the interior 
troops and police special forces within the 
interior ministry. Above all, fighting terror-
ism requires intelligence and investigatory 
powers that the National Guard – unlike 
the police and the domestic intelligence 
service FSB – does not possess. In counter-
terrorism the new structure functions 
merely as a force multiplier. 
Fear of Social Unrest or a 
“Russian Maidan” 
The National Guard possesses greater im-
portance as protection against internal 
unrest and mass demonstrations. Since the 
“colour revolutions” of the 2000s and the 
Arab Spring of 2011, and above all since 
the protests against election manipulation 
in Moscow and St Petersburg in 2011/2012, 
the Kremlin’s security discourse has been 
dominated by the spectre of a “Russian 
Maidan”. 
At present there is little sign of immi-
nent mass protests in the Russian popula-
tion. In a survey by the Levada Center in 
June 2016 only 11 and 8 percent respectively 
said they would participate in social or 
political demonstrations. And since the 
annexation of Crimea in 2014, President 
Putin’s approval ratings have returned 
to levels consistently above 80 percent. 
Yet the Russian leadership faces great 
domestic challenges. The basis of its 
legitimacy, its ability to raise the standard 
of living of broad sections of the popula-
tion, is crumbling. Compounded by a low 
oil price and the impact of Western sanc-
tions, the failure to push through economic 
structural reforms has led to a collapse of 
the rouble, rising prices and falling real in-
comes. In view of dwindling state revenues 
and reserves, there will be no alternative 
to either increasing taxes or making cuts in 
welfare and education. 
If the leadership fails to provide the ex-
pected socio-economic outputs, hitherto 
isolated social protests could increase. Mass 
demonstrations by the liberal opposition – 
of the kind seen in 2011/2012 – appear less 
likely, as the liberal camp is marginalised 
and lacks popular leaders. But issues like 
corruption and nationalism could still in-
ject political demands into social protests. 
One potential trigger could be elections to 
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the State Duma in September 2016, and 
above all the presidential election in spring 
2018. 
With the National Guard the Kremlin 
has created an effective, broader-based 
instrument for deterring and repressing 
possible (mass) protests, which was pre-
viously the responsibility above all of the 
OMON special forces. From the Kremlin’s 
perspective this would be especially advan-
tageous if a state of emergency had to be 
declared to contain growing, coalescing 
protests. But the National Guard is only one 
element in a series of measures by which 
the Moscow leadership seeks to protect 
itself against threats “from below”. In order 
to prevent mass protests arising in the first 
place, legislation imposing state controls 
on NGOs and media outlets and restricting 
the activities of the opposition has been 
tightened since 2012. 
Disciplining the Elites 
The National Guard is not only an organ of 
repression against possible protests in the 
population. It functions even more strongly 
as the president’s personal instrument for 
disciplining the elites. Their loyalty to Putin 
has been rooted in his ability to distribute 
economic resources and political offices 
and to operate as the ultimate mediator 
recognised by all factions. But the economic 
crisis has reduced the wealth available 
to distribute, while the president has cur-
tailed his own room for manoeuvre since 
2012 by weakening the reformist techno-
crats and one-sidedly strengthening the 
siloviki, politicians and officials with a back-
ground in the military and security services. 
While an open palace revolution may be 
unlikely, Putin’s power vertical could grad-
ually erode if conflicts within the elites 
escalate or individual groups build links 
bypassing the president. Elite groups turn-
ing their backs on the president might 
be tempted to instrumentalise social or 
political protest potential. 
The National Guard strengthens Putin’s 
power over elite groups. It is answerable to 
him directly and led by one of his closest 
confidants, Viktor Zolotov. Both come from 
the KGB, and have known each other since 
the early 1990s. From 2000 to 2013 Zolotov 
headed the president’s security service. In 
the event of conflict with parts of the elite, 
Putin thus enjoys direct recourse to a loyal 
paramilitary organisation, whose up to 
400,000 members make it larger than the 
army or the FSB. 
Furthermore, the process of redistribut-
ing powers and capacities associated with 
the founding of the National Guard itself 
strengthens Putin’s position as the decisive 
mediator. Reshuffling the polycentric secu-
rity structures exacerbates institutional 
rivalries and insecurities. The overlapping 
nature of the individual institutions – with 
the National Guard on the one side and the 
FSB (border protection, counter-terrorism), 
interior ministry (public security) and de-
fence ministry (territorial defence) on the 
other – creates potential for conflict. Other 
institutions are likely to be jealous of the 
National Guard receiving its own – as yet 
unspecified budget – and possibilities for 
enrichment, for example through the inte-
grated state-owned company Okhrana. 
The biggest internal security reform in 
more than a decade will also allow Putin 
to keep in check individuals and networks 
that have grown in influence in recent 
years. The focus here is less on the interior 
ministry, as the institution most strongly 
affected by the founding of the National 
Guard, even though it loses about one-third 
of its personnel including its paramilitary 
“muscles”, and is reduced de facto to respon-
sibility for the traffic police and criminal 
investigations. Interior Minister Vladimir 
Kolokoltsev was never one of the big players; 
the powerful figures are Defence Minister 
Sergey Shoygu, FSB head Alexander Bort-
nikov and Ramzan Kadyrov, head of the 
Chechen Republic. Shoygu is popular, 
with his own following and military power 
resources – a unique combination in the 
Putin system. The FSB was a beneficiary of 
the last security reform in 2003, and has 
been able to significantly expand its powers 
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since then. As far as the Chechen leader is 
concerned, his loyal security forces (“Kady-
rovtsy”) now come under the formal control 
of the National Guard; for Putin this is a 
guarantee against Kadyrov becoming too 
independent. 
Refocusing on Internal Policy 
Even if Russia’s official security discourse 
is still dominated by postulated external 
threats – above all concerning NATO’s 
activities in Eastern Europe – the founding 
of the National Guard shows that Putin has 
come to locates the real dangers elsewhere: 
in Islamist terrorism, and above all in the 
convergence of socio-economic problems. 
Here the security reform strengthens two 
long-standing trends. Firstly, the political 
leadership is expanding its means of repres-
sion against opposition and civil society. If 
hitherto isolated and local (social) protests 
were to come to a head, the National Guard 
can be expected to clamp down quickly and 
energetically. 
Secondly, Putin is attempting to consoli-
date his personal power vertical within the 
political leadership. His “divide and rule” 
model requires permanent readjustment, 
otherwise there is a risk of conflicts between 
the elite groups spiralling out of control. 
The founding of the National Guard both 
strengthens the siloviki and exacerbates ri-
valries among them. Since spring 2016 the 
FSB in particular has been openly flexing 
its muscles towards the Investigative Com-
mittee, the Federal Protective Service (FSO) 
and the Interior Ministry. The Russian media 
already speak of a “war of the services”. 
For Germany and Europe, this means 
keeping the domestic determinants of Rus-
sian foreign policy under closer observation 
– even if external actors possess few possibil-
ities to influence internal developments. 
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